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Welsh incremental devolution: history repeats itself, first as
tragedy then as tax?
The possibility of significant tax devolution to the Welsh National Assembly appears to be an increasingly
remote prospect. In the latest post of Democratic Audit’s Future of the Union series, Adam Evans argues that













Orders, a system for
devolving
taxation, should
become the focus for
Welsh devolutionists.
If  t ime f lies by when
you’re having f un, the
Wales Of f ice must be
in an almost
catatonic state of  puritanical despondency since the publication of  the f irst report of  the Silk
Commission (established by government to explore the Welsh devolution settlement) in 2012. Having
stretched the meaning of  Spring to new levels (or should that perhaps be depths), the Wales Of f ice is still
to of f er a meaningf ul response to the Commission’s recommendations of  a partial devolution of  taxation
to the National Assembly f or Wales. A situation that is particularly curious since insistence on some
measure of  f iscal responsibility f or the Assembly was not only written into the Commission’s terms of
ref erence, but was placed as the Commission’s highest priority by being part one of  the Commission’s
remit (and thus able to respond and be enacted upon during the lif espan of  the coalit ion government).
The possibility of  some measure of  signif icant tax devolution to the National Assembly appears to be an
increasingly remote prospect. Firstly, Silk, in response to Welsh Labour and the chairman’s personal mission
f or cross-party consensus, insisted that any f orm of  income tax devolution (the biggest source of
potential government revenue in Wales) would be dependent on a ref erendum. As Wyn Jones has argued, a
ref erendum on such a proposal appears unlikely to occur, particularly because of  the quadruple lock (the
approval of  the UK and Welsh Governments, both chambers of  Parliament and two thirds of  Welsh
Assembly Members) required to activate the ref erendum. However, even were a ref erendum to occur it
appears dif f icult to see it being a success f or devolutionists, af ter all who could envisage, or would be
willing to consider, campaigning under the banner “Yes to Taxation.” Such a campaign would be doomed to
f ail, indeed Welsh Labour’s argument behind such a ref erendum is rooted in the claim that campaigners in
the 2011 Welsh f urther powers ref erendum had to specif ically promise that income tax would not be
devolved. If  this was the biggest stumbling block “Yes f or Wales” campaigners f aced among voters, then we
should hardly be f illed with conf idence f or the prospects of  any such ref erendum were it to happen.
However, a more recent threat has emerged to the potential devolution of  f iscal accountability to the
National Assembly f or Wales and more worryingly f or proponents of  f iscal devolution this has emanated
f rom the department that had been the bastion of  such devolution; the Treasury. In a consultation launched
last month on the devolution of  Stamp Duty to the Assembly (as recommended by both the Holtham and
Silk reviews) the Treasury asked a number of  questions:
the potential impacts on the construction industry and the property market (including the housing
market) given the populous border between Wales and England;
the likely impact on investment and business location decisions that might result  f rom dif f erent
property transaction tax regimes in England and Wales;
the administrative burdens on companies and the conveyancing prof ession f rom  having to comply
with potentially dif f erent property transaction tax regimes and  deal with dif f erent collection
authorit ies in England and Wales.
It does not take the wits of  a high calibre polit ical scientist or consultant to read between the lines of  such
questions or of  the purpose of  the Treasury’s consultation. Having been at the vanguard of  f iscal
accountability, the Treasury is now the staunch def ender of  an increasing discredited f iscal ancien regime,
providing a consultation that in any other context would be compared to push polling i.e. seeking deliberate
answers to their questions. In this case clearly seeking responses that are opposed to the devolution of
Stamp duty devolution to the Assembly.
Indeed, the seemingly deliberate devosceptical att itude of  the Treasury’s stamp duty consultation is only
f urther enhanced when one considers recent articles f rom The Times and The Telegraph to the
consequences of  stamp duty devolution, journals of  record that can hardly be accused of  providing regular
analysis of  the Welsh devolution dispensation. For both newspapers, the tone was overwhelmingly a
negative one, warning that devolution of  stamp duty could see English second home owners penalised with
a specif ically targeted tax bill (f or example, see here).
If  any f orm of  income or stamp duty devolution looks unlikely then what about the rest of  the Silk agenda I
hear you ask, af ter all surely the aggregates levy is saf e? Well… no. The aggregates levy, described by Silk
as a “tax on sand, gravel and rock that is dug f rom the ground or dredged f rom the sea in UK waters” may
appear relatively uncontentious on f irst glance, yet a f urther analysis again reveals a more pessimistic (f or
devolutionists) picture. Despite recommending, in principle, that the aggregates levy should be devolved,
Silk essentially of f ers a more tentative suggestion. Following legal challenges against the use of  the
aggregates levy in Northern Ireland that has seen success f or the Brit ish Aggregates Association, who
have opposed any f orm of  aggregates relief  in the province, in the European Courts, Silk actually ends up
recommending that “it would not be appropriate to devolve the levy while any doubt as to the legality of
doing so remains”.
With barriers to signif icant f iscal devolution emerging f rom sources as diverse as the Brit ish Aggregates
Association, Bristol Airport , Welsh Labour and the Treasury, one might be f orgiven f or writ ing Silk of f
entirely. However, one should not completely write of f  the chances of  any devolution of  f iscal levers to the
National Assembly f or Wales. Indeed, hope may lie in mechanisms that have gone down in Welsh
constitutional inf amy.
Within both Silk and the Calman Commission reports is the recommendation in both Wales and Scotland of
concordats between those respective nations and Westminster over the creation of  new taxes and that
when Westminster is considering new f orms of  taxation the presumption should be in f avour of  devolving
such taxation to the respective legislatures (this f orms Recommendation Nine in the Silk Commission’s
First Report). The Scotland Act 2012 legislates f or this recommendation, in Part Three of  the Act, creating
the mechanism, via an Order in Council, f or Her Majesty to:
“a) specif y, as an additional devolved tax, a tax of  any description” (Scotland Act, Part 3 Section 80B: 16).”
For Welsh constitutional scholars, or amateur anoraks, such mechanisms may bring back cold sweats and
memories of  Part Three of  the Government of  Wales Act 2006 and the byzantine system of  Legislative
Competence Orders (a mechanism that essentially created a tricameral Welsh legislature by requiring the
Assembly to seek legislative powers via Orders in Council that were dependent on the approval of  the
House of  Commons and Lords). Yet, despite the bad memories and impracticalit ies of  LCOs, in the f ace of
such substantial opposition f rom vested interests in industry, Welsh Labour and (it apparently seems) the
Treasury, this system f or devolving taxation, legislated f or in the 2012 Scotland Act and recommended in
Silk and which I have decided to label as Financial Competence Orders, should become the f ocus f or Welsh
devolutionists. Slow and laborious it may be, but in the short term FCOs may be the least worst system of
securing a meaningf ul devolution of  f iscal accountability f or the National Assembly f or Wales.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not Democratic Audit, nor of the London School of
Economics. It originally appeared on the LSE Politics and Policy Blog and can be viewed here. Please read our
comments policy before posting.
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This post is part of  Democratic Audit’s Future of the Union series, which explores the UK’s
f uture prospects as a polit ical union and the implications of  constitutional and territorial
changes. To read more posts in this series click here.
 
 
